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SEMANTIC VAGUENESS AND EXTRAJUDICIAL 
CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING 
Anthony O’Rourke* 
This Article integrates two scholarly conversations to shed light on the divergent 
ways in which courts and legislatures implement constitutional texts. First, there is a 
vast literature examining the different ways in which courts and extrajudicial institu-
tions, including legislatures, implement the Constitution’s textuallyvague expressions. 
Second, in recent years legal philosophers have begun to use philosophy of language 
to elucidate the relationship between vague legal texts and the content of laws. There 
is little scholarship, however, that uses philosophyof language to analyze the divergent 
ways in which legislatures and courts implement vague constitutional provisions. This 
Article argues that many legislative and judicial enactments can—and should—be re-
characterized as efforts to “precisify” vague constitutional language. This re-charac-
terization, I argue, has at least two benefits. First, it provides a resource for defending 
the legitimacy of “legislative constitutionalism” in cases where there is adivergence 
between how courts and legislatures implement a constitutional text. Second, it will 
enable scholars to move beyond longstanding and sometimes unproductive taxonomic 
debates concerning the types of activity that count as constitutional interpretation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Constitution is replete with vague textual provisions that courts and legisla-
tures, respectively, implement in divergent ways. Legislation to prevent “unreasonable 
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1302 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 25:1301 
searches and seizures,”1 for example, often departs significantly from Fourth Amend-
ment doctrine.2 Statutes that enforce “equal protection of the laws” likewise bear little 
resemblance to the judicial doctrines governing that right.3 There is a rich literature 
examining the roles of courts and legislatures in implementing the Constitution’s 
textually vague expressions.4 Two features of this literature, however, becloud many 
scholarly analyses of extrajudicial constitutionalism. 
First, scholars often discount the degree to which extrajudicial decisionmaking 
is linked to the Constitution’s text. As scholars have recognized, legislatures and 
courts often diverge significantly in how they implement vague constitutional 
provisions. For example, the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) implements 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, but looks nothing like previous 
judicial understandings of what that clause requires.5 These divergences lead many 
scholars of extrajudicial constitutionalism to treat the application of the Constitution’s 
text as the province of judges, and to assume that legislative enactments are unan-
chored from the text. Many scholars assume that legislatures shape the Constitution’s 
meaning only indirectly. Through statutes, legislatures can articulate norms and values 
that, in turn, shape our collective sense of what the Constitution means.6 Little at-
tention has been given, however, to the ways in which Congress more directly seeks 
to implement the Constitution’s text. 
Second, the extrajudicial constitutionalism literature is littered with terminological 
debris. Specifically, volumes of scholarship have been devoted to whether certain types 
of judicial and legislative decisions should be characterized as“interpretations”—as 
opposed to “understandings” or “constructions”—of the Constitution.7 At the core 
1 U.S. CONST. amend. IV, § 1. 
2 Cf. Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths 
and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 850–55 (2004) (describing how the Su-
preme Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has been shaped by statutory protections 
in federal wiretapping laws). 
3 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV;see infra notes 19–28 and accompanying text. 
4 Significant descriptive accounts of legislative constitutional implementation include 
JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 25 (2011); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & JOHN 
FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: THE NEW AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 14 fig. 2 (2010); 
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 8–10 (1993); William E. Forbath, The New 
Deal Constitution in Exile, 51 DUKE L.J. 165, 169–70 (2001); Robert C. Post & Reva B. 
Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism and Section Five Power: Policentric Interpretation of 
the Family and Medical Leave Act, 112 YALE L.J. 1943, 1947 (2003). A related literature 
examines the ways in which administrative agencies influence our understanding of the 
Constitution. See, e.g., Sophia Z. Lee, Race, Sex, and Rulemaking: Administrative Constitu-
tionalism and the Workplace, 1960 to the Present, 96 VA. L. REV. 799 (2010); Gillian E. 
Metzger, Administrative Constitutionalism, 91 TEX.L.REV.1897,1897–98 (2013); Bertrall L. 
Ross II, Embracing Administrative Constitutionalism, 95 B.U. L.REV.519, 522 (2015). For the 
sake of scope, this Article postpones analysis of administrative constitutional decisionmaking. 
5 See infra notes 21–24 and accompanying text. 
6 See generally ESKRIDGE, JR. & FEREJOHN, supra note 4. 
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of this debate is a genuine disagreement over the appropriate methods of elaborating 
the Constitution’s meaning. However, the debate comes at a cost: the lack of a co-
herent vocabulary for scholars of extrajudicial constitutionalism who are venturing 
to explore questions other than the legitimacy of the various interpretive methodolo-
gies that are on offer. 
This Article uses recent work in philosophy of language to address these two 
deficiencies in the extrajudicial constitutionalism literature. Drawing upon scholarship 
on semantic vagueness, I argue that many constitutional decisions—both legislative and 
judicial—can be understood as efforts to “precisify” vague constitutional texts. This 
account of constitutional decisionmaking has at least two analytical benefits. First, it 
shows that if courts and legislatures are both authorized to implement a constitutionally 
vague text, their strategies for doing so will necessarily diverge. A philosophically in-
formed account of semantic vagueness thus calls into question the assumption that leg-
islatures do not play a direct role in implementing vague constitutional provisions. 
Third, this framework allows one to sidestep the seemingly intractable definitional 
debate over which types of decisionmaking qualify as constitutional “interpretation.” 
Simply put, both “interpretation” and “construction” of the Constitution—in the many 
ways those terms are defined—can be treated as ways of precisifying the document’s 
text. By adopting this vocabulary, one can better analyze the subtle ways in which 
a text’s structure and linguistic meaning can shape constitutional decisionmaking. This 
terminological simplification will not resolve the question of whether it is norma-
tively legitimate for legislatures to shape the Constitution’s meaning. However, it may 
allow for a clearer analysis of how they go about doing so. 
Methodologically, this Article brings two growing literatures into conversation. 
In legal philosophy, scholars have developed increasingly sophisticated accounts of 
the ways in which semantic vagueness shapes the development of substantive law.8 
Much of this scholarship, however, focuses on the ways in which vagueness influ-
ences judicial decisionmaking, and ignores how legislatures and other lawmaking 
institutions grapple with semantically vague constitutional texts. In constitutional 
theory, meanwhile, there is wide recognition that much of constitutional law is made 
outside the courts.9 Many have observed that the vague language of the United States 
Constitution serves to legitimize this—constitutionalism10—but their analysis of 
8 The contributions of these scholars are cited throughout the Article. Pioneering works 
include TIMOTHY A.O.ENDICOTT,VAGUENESS INLAW(2000) and Jeremy Waldron, Vagueness 
in Law and Language: Some Philosophical Issues, 82 CALIF.L.REV.509 (1994). Many other 
significant contributions can be found in PHILOSOPHICALFOUNDATIONS OF VAGUENESS IN THE 
LAW (Andrei Marmor & Scott Soames eds., 2011) [hereinafter PHILOSOPHICALFOUNDATIONS]. 
9 See sources cited supranote 4. 
10 See, e.g., BALKIN, supra note 4, at 25 (arguing that the Constitution’s use of “the vague 
and abstract language of principles” suggests that its goal is to “channel politics, by articulating 
a collection of key values and commitments that set the terms of political discourse”); KEITH 
E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
MEANING 26 (1999) (arguing that extrajudicial constitutional “construction” is “expanded by the 
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vagueness tends to stop there. By merging these conversations, this Article lays out 
new research paths for using legal philosophy to shed light on the realities of con-
stitutional practice. 
This Article is organized into four Parts. Part I briefly defends the premise that 
some legislation can be analyzed as an effort to implement the Constitution’s text. 
Part II defines semantic vagueness and shows that constitutional decisionmaking 
involves the precisification of vague expressions. Applying this insight, Part III shows 
thatdivergences between legislative and constitutional decisionmaking result inevitably 
from the application of semantically vague constitutional provisions. Thus, the ubiquity 
of semantically vague textual provisions in the Constitution suggests that the docu-
ment is designed to promote institutional competition over the implementation of its 
guarantees. Part IV highlights this Article’s significant implications for longstanding 
debates over the nature of constitutional interpretation. 
I. LEGISLATIVE DECISIONMAKING AND CONSTITUTIONAL TEXT 
This Article proceeds from the premise that courts and legislatures both serve 
the function of implementing semantically vague constitutional texts. This premise 
may not seem obvious to readers who have a passing familiarity with the extrajudi-
cial constitutionalism literature. Scholars have identified a number of statutes that 
contribute to our understanding of the Constitution’s meaning.11 Less attention has 
been paid, however, to the relationship between these statutes and the Constitution’s 
actual text. Scholars often treat legislative enactments as part of the “small-c” con-
stitution, which is comprised of “the web of documents, practices, institutions, 
norms, and traditions that structure American government.”12 According to Richard 
Primus’s summary of “small-c” constitutional theory, the rules that are developed 
in this fashion are “not grounded in the text of the big-C Constitution.”13 
This characterization of legislative constitutional decisionmaking is accurate to 
the extent that the Constitution’s text does not require Congress to enact statutes that 
contribute to our constitutional structure. This is not to say, however, that the “big-C 
Constitution’s” text plays no role in shaping legislation that contributes to the “small-c” 
constitution. As Curtis Bradley and Neil Siegel have recently argued, there are many 
limited possibility of decisive interpretation” of the Constitution’s text); Lawrence B. Solum, 
The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 95, 106 (2010) (linking 
extrajudicial “construction” to linguistic vagueness). 
11 See ESKRIDGE, JR. & FEREJOHN, supra note 4, at 8–9 (“Although the Constitution as a 
formal matter trumps statutes inconsistent with its terms, as a practical matter Constitutional 
law’s evolution is generally—and ought to be—influenced by the norms entrenched in other 
ways, such as by the development of astate statutory consensus, or through the creation of 
a federal superstatute.”); WilliamN. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE 
L.J.1215, 1230–46 (2001) (analyzing the “Constitution-bending” effects of the Sherman Anti-
trust Act of 1890, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the Endangered Species Act of 1973). 
12 Richard Primus, Unbundling Constitutionality, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1079, 1080 (2013). 
13 Id. at 1082. 
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instances in which nonjudicial officials perceive themselves as being constrained 
by the plain meaning of the Constitution’s text.14 These officials’ pereptions of the 
Constitution’s textual clarity, Professors Bradley and Siegel argue, often are the 
product of the interpreters’ normative commitments and other extratextual consider-
ations.15 Nevertheless, the officials perceive their contributions to the “small-c” 
constitution as being justified by and grounded in the Constitution’s text.16 
For the purposes of this Article, there are two central points that one can distill 
from this argument. First, there are instances in which one can regard Congress as 
intending to use statutes to implement the Constitution’s text.17 Second, in some of 
these instances, the constitutional text at issue might have a greater degree of seman-
tic vagueness than Congress recognizes.18 
14 Curtis A. Bradley & Neil S. Siegel, Constructed Constraint and the Constitutional 
Text, 64 DUKE L.J. 1213, 1217–18 (2015). 
15 Id. at 1216–17 (arguing that the “perceived clarity” of the Constitution’s text can be af-
fected byconsiderations that include “reasoning about the purpose of a constitutional provision, 
structural inferences, understandings of the national ethos, consequentialist considerations, 
customary practice, and precedent”). 
16 Cf. William Baude, Essay, Is Originalism Our Law?, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2349, 2389 
(2015) (“[T]he fact—if it is true—that interpreters throughout history have tried to find ways 
to characterize text as ambiguous does not show that unambiguous text is empty or symbolic; 
if anything, it shows that it is thought binding.” (footnote omitted)). 
17 Here and elsewhere in this Article, I ascribe intentions and motivations to courts and 
legislatures when discussing their constitutional decisionmaking strategies. For extended 
defenses of this approach to legislative intentions specifically (and collective intentions more 
generally), see RICHARD EKINS,THENATURE OFLEGISLATIVE INTENT 218–43 (2012); Victoria 
F. Nourse, Elementary Statutory Interpretation: Rethinking Legislative Intent and History, 
55 B.C. L. REV. 1613, 1614–17 (2014); Scott J. Shapiro, Massively Shared Agency, in RATIONAL 
ANDSOCIALAGENCY:THE PHILOSOPHY OFMICHAELBRATMAN 257,259–61(Manuel Vargas 
& Gideon Yaffe eds., 2014). For a discussion of recent cognitive science literature that 
supports the ascription of intentions to institutions, see Mihailis E. Diamantis, Corporate 
Criminal Minds, 91 NOTREDAMEL.REV. 2049, 2077–79 (2016). I recognize, of course, that 
there are other contexts in which it may be misleading to treat institutions as having col-
lective intentions. See generally, e.g., Kenneth A. Schepsle, Congress Is a “They,” Not an “It”: 
Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 239 (1992); Adrian Vermeule, 
The Judiciary Is a They, Not an It: Interpretive Theory and the Fallacy of Division, 14 J. 
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 549 (2005). 
18 I use the terms “legislative constitutional decisionmaking” and “legislative constitu-
tionalism” to refer to the process by which legislatures implement norms embodied in the 
Constitution, especially norms linked to specific constitutional provisions. Cf. Joy Milligan, 
Protecting Disfavored Minorities: Toward Institutional Realism, 63 UCLAL.REV. 894, 897 
n.6 (2016) (noting that “[t]he term ‘constitutionalism’ . . . has no settled meaning” and using 
the term to refer to the “broad set of practices that are involved as officials and ordinary 
individuals invoke, make claims upon, contest, and implement the norms embodied in the U.S. 
Constitution”). This Article proceeds from the premise that legislative constitutional de-
cisionmaking, thus defined, can influence the trajectory of constitutional law in ways that are 
compatible with a traditional understanding of judicial supremacy. See, e.g., ESKRIDGE, JR. 
& FEREJOHN, supra note 4, at 14 (arguing that “normative commitments are announced and 
    
  
   
 






    











    




    
     
1306 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 25:1301 
Granted, it is often unclear whether Congress intends for a statute to give effect 
to the Constitution’s text, or is instead driven by broader normative aims.19 Sometimes, 
however, Congress’s textual commitments are explicit. This often is the case with 
legislation that Congress enacts within its authority under Section 5 of the Four-
teenth Amendment.20 The legislative history of the FMLA,21 for example, describes 
the legislation as “based” on the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.22 The Supreme Court upheld the FMLA as appropriate 
“prophylactic legislation” to enforce the Equal Protection Clause, rather than an im-
permissible “substantive redefinition of the Fourteenth Amendment right at issue.”23 
As Robert Post and Reva Siegel have demonstrated, however, the FMLA can be easily 
reframed as a novel application of the Equal Protection Clause to provide the unusual 
remedy of paid family leave for instances of sex-based employment discrimination.24 
An even clearer example of legislative attention to the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
text involves the Patent and Plant Variety Clarification Act.25 Congress justified this 
legislation by asserting that patents are a form of property that merits protection 
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.26 The Supreme Court 
held that Congress exceeded its authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment by enacting the statute.27 Regardless of the Court’s determination, however, 
Congress’s justification for the legislation involved the intentional application of a 
vague constitutional provision—“nor shall any State deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law”—to a novel context.28 
Even when Congress does not invoke its Section 5 power, it sometimes ex-
pressly justifies legislation by reference to the Constitution’s text. Consider, for 
entrenched . . . through the more gradual process of legislation, administrative implementa-
tion, public feedback, and legislative reaffirmation and elaboration”). 
19 See Jamal Greene, How Constitutional Theory Matters, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 1183, 1198–99 
(2011) (questioning the practical relevance of legislative constitutionalism on the ground that 
“[a]rguments from morality, justice, democracy, or common sense are sometimes conflated 
with constitutional arguments”). 
20 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 (“The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appro-
priate legislation, the provisions of this article.”). 
21 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2654 (2012). 
22 H.R. REP. NO. 103-8(i), at 29 (1993); S. REP. NO. 103-3, at 16 (1993), as reprinted in 
1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 18. 
23 Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 728 (2003) (quoting Kimel v. Fla. 
Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 81 (2000)). 
24 See Post & Siegel, supra note 4, at 1971–80. 
25 35 U.S.C. § 296 (1992) (amending the federal patent laws to abrogate state sovereign 
immunity), invalidated by Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 
527 U.S. 627 (1999). 
26 S. REP. NO. 102-280, at 8 (1992), as reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3087, 3094. 
27 See Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 639–48. 





















    
 
       
  
   
 
      
   
  
   
    
2017] SEMANTIC VAGUENESS AND CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING 1307 
example, the Speedy Trial Act of 1974.29 With that statute, Congress made clear that 
it was passing legislation to operationalize a vague constitutional provision. The 
Speedy Trial Act’s title is something of a giveaway. Beyond the title, however, the 
House Judiciary Committee Report on the Speedy Trial Act of 1974 states that the 
bill was designed to “give effect to the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial” in 
a way that would “assist in reducing crime and the danger of recidivism[.]”30 Thus, 
there is a high degree of transparency regarding Congress’s intention to implement 
the Sixth Amendment’s speedy trial right through legislation. 
Similarly, the Supreme Court has demonstrated a relatively marked degree of 
textual fidelity in its speedy trial jurisprudence. Relative to other areas of criminal 
procedure, the text of the Sixth Amendment has played an obvious role in judicial 
efforts to implement the constitutional speedy trial right.31 As explained below, the 
Supreme Court has expressly recognized the vagueness of the Speedy Trial Clause.32 
Moreover, when deciding speedy trial cases, the Court has employed textual argu-
ments without appealing to other modalities of constitutional argumentation that are 
common in other criminal procedure contexts.33 
This is not to suggest, however, that there is equivalence between the constitutional 
functions that courts and legislatures fulfill when they implement constitutional 
texts.34 Courts implement the Constitution in the course of engaging in judicial 
review over legislative or executive actions.35 Judicial implementation of the Con-
stitution thus involves the politically delicate task of standing in judgment of a 
coordinate branch of government or of a state government. Congress, by contrast, 
implements the Constitution in the course of exercising its prerogative to make new 
laws to guide and constrain the executive branch. Constitutional implementation of 
the Constitution is thus an activity that is often done implicitly, and in the course of 
either addressing a policy problem or (increasingly) delegating power to the execu-
tive branch to address the problem.36 Legislatures may therefore implement the 
29 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161–3174 (2012). 
30 H.R. REP. NO. 93-1508 (1974), as reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7401, 7402. 
31 Cf. Jeffrey L. Fisher, Categorical Requirements in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 
94 GEO. L.J. 1493, 1497 n.21 (2006) (“[F]rom several years of experience litigating criminal 
procedure issues on appeal, I can attest that the criminal defense bar also spends minimal 
time developing conceptions of constitutional text.”); William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Rela-
tionship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 YALEL.J.1,72 (1997) (noting 
the “extreme rarity of textual argument in [the] area” of constitutional criminal procedure). 
32 See infra notes 45–48 and accompanying text. 
33 Cf. PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 7–8 
(1982) (presenting a typology of constitutional “modalities” that include historical, textual, 
structural, doctrinal, and ethical arguments). 
34 I am grateful to Larry Solan for this point. 
35 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1996 Term, Foreward: Implementing the 
Constitution, 111 HARV. L. REV. 54, 111 (1997). 
36 See Adrian Vermeule, Optimal Abuse of Power, NW. U. L. REV. 673, 683–88 (2015) 
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Constitution in relatively imaginative ways that obscure the degree to which their 
decisionmaking is grounded in the document’s text.37 The fact that a legislative 
constitutional decision does not necessarily look like a judicial one, however, does 
not necessarily mean that it was unanchored from the Constitution’s text. 
II. SEMANTIC VAGUENESS AND PRECISIFICATION 
Legal scholars frequently remark on the Constitution’s textual vagueness, but 
rarely explain what it means for a text to be vague.38 Indeed, scholars and judges 
sometimes misuse the term “vagueness” to describe legal texts that are ambiguous 
(i.e., that have more than one distinct meaning39) or that display some other type of 
indeterminacy.40 This casual usage serves to conceal some of the ways in which 
semantically vague texts can shape constitutional law. This Part therefore provides 
a working account of semantic vagueness. It then argues thatmost judicial and leg-
islative constitutional decisions can be understood as efforts to “precisify” vague 
constitutional texts.41 Thus understood, one can provide an analytically productive 
account of how vague constitutional texts necessarily generate divergences between 
how courts and legislatures seek to implement the Constitution. 
A. Semantic Vagueness Defined 
Philosophers of language define semantic vagueness by reference to “borderline 
cases.”42 That is, an expression is “vague” if “there are cases (actual or possible) in 
(describing legislative strategies to compensate for legislatures being “structurally incapable 
of supplying policy change at the necessary rates”). 
37 Cf. Elizabeth Garrett & Adrian Vermeule, Institutional Design of a Thayerian Congress, 
50 DUKE L.J. 1277, 1310 (2001) (arguing that “the institutional strength of Congress is not 
its attention to legalisms but its expertise in the policy aspects of constitutional decisions”). 
38 For a notable exception, see Solum, supra note 10, at 98 (providing a standard defi-
nition of vagueness). 
39 See Jill C. Anderson, Misreading Like A Lawyer: Cognitive Bias in Statutory Interpre-
tation, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1521, 1534–35 (2014). 
40 See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 399, 421 (1985) (“Although 
constitutional theorists tend to use (or misuse) the term ‘open texture’ as no more than a 
synonym for ‘vagueness,’ it has a different technical, philosophical meaning.”). 
41 This account will not touch on many of the competing theories of semantic vagueness. 
See, e.g., Roy Sorensen, Vagueness, STAN.ENCYCLOPEDIAPHIL.(Feb. 8, 1997), http://plato.stan 
ford.edu/entries/vagueness/ (last modified Mar.12, 2012) (summarizing these theories). It does, 
however, adequately describe semantic vagueness as it isunderstood by most legal philosophers. 
42 See id. (“There is wide agreement that a term is vague to the extent that it has 
borderline cases.”); see also ENDICOTT, supra note 8, at 31 (“An expression is vague if there 
are borderline cases for its application.”); cf. Waldron, supra note 8, at 520 (cautioning that 
one’s concept of a borderline case will depend on the “paradigm” cases that one takes to be 
at the core of a vague word’s application). 
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which one just does not know whether to apply the expression or to withhold it, and 
one’s not knowing is not due to ignorance of the facts.”43 Consider, for example, the 
expression ‘tall’ as it applies to a collection of natural rock formations. A competent 
English speaker might know that the expression applies to Mount Everest, and that 
it does not apply to a clump of pebbles. There will be some hill, however, for which 
the speaker does not (and potentially cannot) know whether the expression applies.44 
This is a borderline case. 
So defined, semantic vagueness is a well-recognized feature of the U.S. Consti-
tution. Consider, for example, the Sixth Amendment’s “right to a speedy . . . trial.” 
In a rare instance of candor as to the Constitution’s indeterminacy, the Supreme 
Court acknowledged the vagueness of the Speedy Trial Clause in language consis-
tent with this philosophical definition. Specifically, in Barker v. Wingo,45 the Court 
explained that “[i]t is . . . impossible to determine with precision when the right has 
been denied. We cannot definitely say how long is too long in a system where 
justice is supposed to be swift but deliberate.”46 There are certainly expeditious 
adjudications that anyone would characterize as “speedy trials,” and unconscionably 
lengthy cases that nobody would characterize as “speedy trials.” But there are also 
borderline cases for which there is no non-arbitrary way to decide whether a trial 
was speedy. We may agree that a thirty-day delay between a drug-smuggling 
defendant’s indictment and his conviction honors his speedy trial right. Likewise, 
we may agree that the right is violated when the delay lasts thirty years. We may 
likewise agree that the speedy trial right is violated if the government postpones a 
murder defendant’s trial for five years solely for the purpose of gaining a tactical 
43 PAULGRICE, Postwar Oxford Philosophy, in STUDIES IN THE WAY OF WORDS 171, 177 
(1989); see also ENDICOTT, supra note 8, at 31–33 (elaborating on Grice’s definition of vague). 
44 There is a debate as to whether one can know whether a vague expression applies to 
a borderline case. Semantic theories hold that a vagueexpression is indeterminate (or undefined) 
with respect to its application to borderline cases. See ENDICOTT, supra note 8, at 138. Thus, 
competent speakers may agree that the expression ‘tall’ applies to alarge mountain and that 
it does not apply to a mound of dirt. ‘Tall’ might be undefined, however, with respect to the 
borderline cases of a hill. Epistemic theories, by contrast, hold that vague expressions are 
always precisely defined, and that we are simply ignorant of their correct application to 
borderline cases. See generally TIMOTHY WILLIAMSON,VAGUENESS (1994). Thus, according 
to the epistemic theorist, there is always a hill, x, that is not tall, and an infinitesimally larger 
hill, x, that is tall. See Andrei Marmor & Scott Soames, Introduction to PHILOSOPHICAL 
FOUNDATIONS, supra note 8, at 5–6. The definition offered here is sufficiently capacious to 
accommodate both “semantic” and “epistemic” theories of vagueness. The epistemic theory is 
controversial, however, and in any event is unlikely to resolve the practical challenges that 
vagueness poses for legal decisionmakers. See ANDREI MARMOR, THE LANGUAGE OF LAW 86 
n.1 (2014) (“[I]t probably makes no difference, in the legal context, which particular theory 
of vagueness one works with.”). To the extent that the claims in this Article conflict with the 
epistemic theory of vagueness, the conflicts reflect a rejection of the view. 
45 407 U.S. 514 (1972). 
46 Id. at 521 (footnote omitted). 
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advantage. Is the right violated, however, when the same delay occurs in part be-
cause the defendant is hoping that the government will lose its leverage over a 
cooperating witness?47 In such a borderline case, we might know the precise length 
and circumstances of a trial delay without knowing—and, possibly, without being 
able to know—whether the defendant received a “speedy trial.”48 Thus, the Court 
implicitly recognized the existence of borderline cases in which a speaker does not 
(or cannot) know whether the “speedy trial” right is violated. 
Looking beyond the speedy trial clause, semantic vagueness is endemic to the 
Constitution’s rights provisions. For example, we may know the precise length and 
circumstances of a borderline-constitutional police stop without knowing whether it 
amounted to an “unreasonable . . . seizure[.]”49 Similarly, we may know the precise sen-
tence that a convicted defendant receives without knowing whether it was a “cruel and 
unusual punishment[,]”50 and we may know precisely how much that defendant was 
forced to pay in restitution without knowing whether it was an “excessive fine[.]”51 
Or, turning to an even more indeterminate phrase, all can now agree that de 
facto racial segregation constitutes a denial of “the equal protection of the laws.”52 
A borderline case, however, might include whether the Equal Protection Clause is 
violated by a statute that prohibits race-conscious busing programs designed to 
facilitate the integration of an urban school district.53 If that statute were unconstitu-
tional, would the same school district run afoul of the Equal Protection Clause if it 
implemented a race-conscious school assignment policy designed to ensure that its 
most oversubscribed and desirable schools are racially integrated?54 There simply 
may be no semantically definite answer to such a question. 
B. Precisification of Legal Texts 
In many contexts, including lawmaking, a competent speaker must choose 
whether to apply a vague expression toa borderline case even when the choice will 
generate disagreements with other competent speakers. In these borderline cases, we 
can describe the speaker as offering a “precisification” of a vague term.55 Consider, 
47 See id. at 533, 536 (holding that the speedy trial right was not violated under such cir-
cumstances but emphasizing that it was a “close” case). 
48 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
49 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
50 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
51 Id. 
52 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 
483, 488–89, 491–92 (1954). 
53 See Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 459, 487 (1982) (invali-
dating such a statute under the Equal Protection Clause). 
54 See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 711 
(2007) (invalidating such a policy). 
55 See Kit Fine, Vagueness, Truth and Logic, 30 SYNTHESE 235, 271–78 (1975). 
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for example, a speaker who is evaluating whether a borderline-tall hill is ‘tall.’ The 
speaker might be aware that it is impossible to say whether to apply or withhold the 
term ‘tall’ to the hill. But the circumstances of the conversation might nonetheless 
force the speaker to assert that a particular hill is, or is not, tall. (Suppose, for ex-
ample, that the speaker works for a ski resort and is responsible for classifying the 
hill as one that is appropriate for beginners.) Suppose that the speaker decides that 
the hill is tall given the context of the conversation. Others might disagree with the 
truth of the claim but nevertheless agree that the speaker has offered a plausible (or 
“admissible”56) precisification of the vague expression.57 
The term “precisification” is borrowed from a theory of vagueness that philoso-
phers do not universally accept. It is, however, particularly useful for analyzing the 
processes by which officials apply vague legal texts. The term is associated with a 
supervaluationist theory of vagueness, and is used to describe the application of vague 
terms to borderline cases.58 In broad strokes, supervaluationists argue that there are 
“truth-gaps” in how a vague term applies to objects. Specifically, “a vague sentence 
is true if true for all complete precisifications[.]”59 For example, the sentence “the hill 
is tall or it is not tall” could conform to the supervaluationist’s definition of truth. 
However, a precisification such as “the hill is tall” may be “admissible”—acceptable 
to competent speakers—without being true. 
Regardless whether the supervaluationist account of vagueness is correct, the 
term “precisification” is useful for describing how vagueness influences legal 
decisionmaking. For example, an epistemic theorist might argue that, for the purposes 
of evaluating the truth of a vague sentence, the concept of precisification is useless. 
For the epistemic theorist it is either true or false that a particular hill is tall; there 
are no truth-gaps.60 Lawmakers, however, must make decisions under conditions of 
epistemic uncertainty in which nobody knows how a vague legal expression should 
apply to a borderline case. It is therefore helpful to characterize a lawmaker’s de-
cision as a “precisification” of the vague expression while bracketing the question 
whether the lawmaker made the epistemologically correct decision. 
Indeed, legal decisionmaking can be said to require speakers to precisify vague 
texts. For example, a court cannot refuse to decide whether or not a defendant’s 
speedy trial right was violated simply because the defendant presents a borderline 
case. The conventions of judicial decisionmaking require the court to decide whether 
or not the speedy trial right was violated no matter how difficult the decision may 
be. This is because, as Timothy Endicott has observed, judicial systems operate 
56 Id. at 272. I use the terms “plausible” and “admissible” interchangeably. 
57 See Delia Graff Fara, Shifting Sands: An Interest-Relative Theory of Vagueness, 28 PHIL. 
TOPICS 45, 57 (2000) (describing the constraints that supervaluationists have argued to be 
determinative of whether a precisification is “admissible”). 
58 See Fine, supra note 55, at 271–78. 
59 Id. at 282. 
60 See WILLIAMSON, supra note 44, at 3. 






















   
 
 
   
 
    
 
   
 
1312 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 25:1301 
according to a principle of “juridical bivalence.”61 This principle entails a system of 
adjudication that “treat[s] people as if the application of the law to their situation 
were bivalent” no matter how vague the law may be.62 Consider, for example, a 
borderline-tall plaintiff who brings a claim under a statute that prohibits height dis-
crimination in employment, but which is worded so that its protections do not 
extend to “tall individuals.” Even if ordinary language leaves it open whether the 
term ‘tall’ applies to the plaintiff, the principle of “juridical bivalence” will require 
the judge to make a determination whether the plaintiff is too ‘tall’ to be in the protected 
class. The plaintiff is ‘tall’ within the meaning of the statute or he is not; there is no 
in-between. 
C. Divergent Precisifications and the Sorites Paradox 
The process of precisifying vague legal texts, coupled with the principle of 
juridical bivalence, will necessarily generate divergent applications of those texts. 
Indeed, such divergence is necessary for lawmakers to avoid the sorites paradox.63 
For any semantically vague expression, it is possible to identify a series of cases 
along a continuum to which the expression may or may not apply. Along this 
continuum—which Timothy Endicott calls a “sorites series”64—there will be (1) a 
set of cases to which the expression obviously applies, (2) a set of cases to which the 
expression obviously does not apply, and (3) a set of borderline cases for which one 
cannot know whether or not the expression applies.65 In a borderline case, two 
speakers might arrive at different conclusions as to whether to apply the expression, 
and we cannot say that either speaker is incorrect in her choice. 
However, the inferential logic that compels aspeaker to applya vague expres-
sion to incrementally different borderline cases would likewise compel her to apply 
the expression in cases that are clearly inappropriate. For example,66 if a trial of n 
days is represented as x , we can say that if x is speedy, then x is also speedy. Of n n n+1
course, a one-day trial, x1, is speedy. Therefore: 
61 ENDICOTT, supra note 8, at 72–73. 
62 Id. at 72. 
63 For a more involved discussion of the paradox, see Dominic Hyde, Sorites Paradox, 
STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Jan. 17, 1997), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/en 
tries/sorites-paradox/ (last modified Dec. 6, 2011). 
64 ENDICOTT, supra note 8, at 34. 
65 See MARMOR, supra note 44, at 88 (“The essential feature of vagueness, in the strict 
semantic sense, consists in the fact that when a word, W, is vague, there are bound to be border-
line cases of W’s application to objects that arein a space between W’s definite extension and 
definite nonextension, objects about which there is no saying whether W applies or not. . . . 
This is clearly the case with words such as ‘rich,’ ‘mature,’ ‘bald,’ etc.”); Waldron, supra note 8, 
at 516 (“In general, problems of vagueness will arise whenever we confront a continuum 
with terminology that has, or aspires to have, a bivalent logic.” (footnote omitted)). 
66 This example and notation closely track Timothy Endicott’s illustration of the sorites 
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(1) x1 is speedy, 
(2) x2 is speedy, 
. . . . 
(5,475) x  is speedy. 5,475 
By applying a valid rule of inferential logic67 based on a clear case, a lawmaker 
would arrive at the obviously false conclusion that a fifteen-year trial would not 
violate the Sixth Amendment. 
At some point, a lawmaker will be compelled to disregard this logic and estab-
lish a cutoff point between a trial xn that is speedy and a trial xn+1 that is not speedy. 
This will require the lawmaker to arrive at different legal conclusions in virtually 
identical borderline cases. Any such decisions are necessarily arbitrary, and the 
lawmaker must make themon some basis other than the epistemic truth that a trial’s 
length is, or is not, speedy within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment.68 
Thus, when a vague legal expression is at issue, the sorites paradox creates a 
powerful incentive for lawmakers to arrive at different legal conclusions in virtually 
identical cases. At the cost of violating the rule-of-law principle that like cases 
should be treated alike,69 judges may be forced to decide that a particular trial was 
not “speedy” within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment notwithstanding the fact 
that an earlier judicial decision approved of a similar (but arguably distinguishable) 
trial delay. Similarly, legislators who are seeking to implement a constitutional 
guarantee may be forced to establish a sharp cutoff point between a trial that does 
not violate the speedy trial right and a trial that does. 
III. PRECISIFICATION AND CONSTITUTIONAL DIVERGENCE 
A precise account of semantic vagueness serves to clarify the frequently made 
(but seldom explained) observation that the Constitution’s vagueness leads to inter-
pretive conflicts. Over the past two decades there has been an explosion of scholarship 
67 Namely, modus ponens. 
68 See Timothy Endicott, The Value of Vagueness, in  PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS, 
supra note 8, at 14, 22–24 (discussing the epistemic arbitrariness of precision). Elsewhere, 
Timothy Endicott explains this point using the illustration of a judge having to decide 
whether a noise ordinance is violated by any one of a “million raves,” each playing music at 
an imperceptibly lower volume than the one before it. See ENDICOTT, supra note 8, at 57–58; 
see also Samuel L. Bray, Preventive Adjudication, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 1275, 1290–91 (2010) 
(discussing Endicott’s “case of the million raves”). 
69 ENDICOTT, supra note 8, at 58; see also H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 163–64 
(3d ed. 2012) (identifying the principle of treating like cases alike as “the central precept of 
justice”). For recent discussions of the treating-like-cases-alike principle, see, e.g., Josh 
Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, and the Equitable Decision Not to Prosecute, 
110 COLUM. L. REV. 1655, 1674–75 (2010); Jeremy Waldron, Stare Decisis and the Rule of 
Law: A Layered Approach, 111 MICH. L. REV. 1, 29–30 (2012). 
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examining the ways in which constitutional law is made both within and outside the 
courts.70 This scholarship has demonstrated that constitutional law is comprised of 
an array of competing judicial doctrines, executive actions, agency policies, and 
legislation, none of which is strictly compelled by the Constitution’s semantic 
meaning.71 Each of these forms of constitutional elaboration, this Part argues, can 
be framed as ways of precisifying semantically vague constitutional provisions. 
As a general matter, legal systems involve what Timothy Endicott calls “reflex-
ivity.”72 That is, a codified legal system will both establish written laws and authorize 
certain institutions to resolve any indeterminacy concerning the content of those 
laws.73 In the United States, the Constitution serves these functions by (1) establish-
ing multiple branches of government, and (2) according overlapping authority to 
those branches to implement the document’s rights provisions. As Jack Balkin has 
argued, the Constitution provides a framework that authorizes the political and judicial 
branches to offer their own “interpretations” of the Constitution.74 One could easily 
rephrase this argument to say that the Constitution empowers the three branches of 
government to offer competing precisifications of the document’s text.75 
First, consider the most obvious contribution to constitutional law: judicial 
doctrine. The principal of juridical bivalence requires that courts stipulate how a vague 
legal text applies in borderline cases.76 One can thus view constitutional doctrine as 
a way of precisifying the Constitution’s text. If the Supreme Court decides that a 
five-year trial delay does not necessarily violate the speedy trial right under certain 
circumstances, and that decision is accorded precedential weight,77 then the Court has 
enhanced the precision of a semantically vague constitutional right. If a subsequent 
70 See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 4–10. 
71 See generally, e.g., BALKIN, supra note 4; WHITTINGTON, supra note 10. 
72 See Timothy Endicott, Vagueness and Law, in VAGUENESS: A GUIDE 171, 171–74 
(Guiseppina Ronzitti ed., 2011). Endicott derives his argument from a reading of the fol-
lowing passage in Aristotle’s Politics: “Where it seems that the law does not draw a boundary, 
it would seem impossible for a human being to identify one. Yet the law trains officials for 
that very purpose, and appoints them to judge and to regulate that which leaves it unde-
termined, as rightly as they can.” Id. at 171 (quoting Aristotle, Politics III.16). 
73 See id.at 171. In Hartian terms, a legal system is the “[u]nion of [p]rimary and [s]econdary 
[r]ules.” HART, supra note 69, at 79. Primary rules directly govern the conduct of legal sub-
jects. Secondary rules govern organizational aspects of a legal system including how to identify 
whether something is a law (the “rule of recognition”) and how to resolve disagreements 
about those laws (the “rule of adjudication”). See id. at 77–99. 
74 See BALKIN, supra note 4, at 3–6. 
75 Indeed, by reframing the process in terms of precisification, one can sidestep the debate 
over whether we should refer to extrajudicial lawmaking asconstitutional “interpretation” 
or as some other phenomenon. 
76 See supra notes 61–62 and accompanying text. 
77 See Endicott, supra note 72, at 173 (“[L]egal systems very commonly use the reso-
lution of disputes as a technique for regulating the meaning and application of their language, 
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case presented the precise circumstances that the Court discussed in its earlier de-
cision, it would be clear that the defendant’s speedy trial right was not violated. At 
the same time, however, the sorites paradox might require another court to decide 
that the speedy trial right was violated in a similar, but distinguishable case.78 
Legislation can also serve to precisify semantically vague constitutional texts.79 
A vague height discrimination statute, for example, might be said to implement an 
even vaguer constitutional norm of equal protection. If a legislature wishes tooffer 
more guidance than simply excluding “tall individuals” from the statute’s pro-
tections, it could specify that the law protects only people whose height does not 
exceed a specific cutoff (say, exactly 5’8”). Such a law would thus stipulate that, in 
certain borderline cases, some individuals will be able to enjoy the statute’s protections 
and others would not. More realistically, the Speedy Trial Act of 197480 generally 
requires that a trial begin within seventy days of a defendant’s initial appearance or 
indictment.81 This statute was expressly designed to give effect to the Sixth Amend-
ment’s speedy trial guarantee.82 In many contexts, however, seventy days might be 
regarded as a borderline delay with respect to the Sixth Amendment’s speedy trial 
right (and in some cases it would not be regarded as raising any sort of constitutional 
problem). Thus, the Act is a necessarily arbitrary legislative precisification of a seman-
tically vague constitutional right. 
One can thus reformulate legislative constitutional decisionmaking as a process 
by which Congress contributes to the Constitution’s meaning by precisifying the 
document’s vague textual provisions. To whatever degree one acknowledges that 
the Constitution authorizes Congress to implement vague constitutional principles, 
one must concede that these implementations will diverge from traditional court-
centered understandings of the Constitution’s text. From a philosophical perspective, 
however, both institutions are engaged in the same task: deciding how to resolve 
borderline cases in which one cannot know, and must therefore merely stipulate, 
whether or not a vague text applies. These concurrent precisification processes will 
necessarily generate divergent applications of a semantically vague expression. 
78 See supra Section II.C. 
79 Legal philosophers appear to have overlooked this function of legislatures. Timothy 
Endicott, for example, emphasizes that semantically vague expressions empower courts to 
make law by deciding borderline cases. See Endicott, supra note 72, at 173 (“Vague laws 
give a form of power to courts. . . . [B]ecause it is characteristic of law to regulate itself, 
courts characteristically make law when they resolve a dispute.”). Likewise, Andrei Marmor 
treats legal vagueness as the product of a dynamic whereby legislatures create semantically 
vague laws, and courts resolve the indeterminacy of vague laws as they apply to the parties 
of a given dispute. See generally MARMOR, supra note 44, at 85–105. 
80 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161–3174 (2012). Certain statutorily enumerated events toll this seventy 
day clock. See, e.g., id. § 3161(h)(1)(D) (tolling the clock for any “delay resulting from any 
pretrial motion”). 
81 Id. § 3161(c)(1); see also Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 492 (2006). 
82 See H.R. REP. NO. 93-1508 (1974), as reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7401, 7402. 
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This divergence is amplified by the fact that many of the Constitution’s semanti-
cally vague provisions are context-sensitive in their application. Many semantically 
vague constitutional expressions involve a gradable adjective that exists in reference 
to a comparison class.83 As Jason Stanley explains, a gradable adjective is one that 
allows for modifiers and that speakers use to make comparative constructions.84 The 
expression ‘tall,’ for example can be modified (“Kevin is tall”) and can be used to 
compare objects or individuals (“Kevin is taller than Isaiah”). A “comparison class” 
consists of the domain of objects that are relevant in the context of a particular utterance 
of an expression using agradable adjective.85 For example, the relevant comparison 
class for the phrase “Kevin is tall” is likely to be a group of individuals (rather than, 
say, a group of skyscrapers). The relevant group of individuals, however, might 
depend on whether Kevin is a law professor or a professional basketball player. 
Depending on the context, one might mean that “Kevin is tall for a law professor” 
or “Kevin is tall for an NBA player.” The phrase “Mount Everest is tall,” however, 
might have mountains as the relevant comparison class. (One often can make the 
intended comparison class of an expression explicit by adding the phrase ‘for an x’). 
The truth conditions of an expression containing a gradable adjective will shift 
based on the context in which it is used.86 Specifically, the comparison class will 
determine the truth conditions for evaluating an utterance that includes a gradable 
adjective.87 The truth conditions for the expression “Kevin is tall,” for example, will 
depend on the comparison class that a group of competent speakers would agree 
upon in a given context. If the appropriate comparison class were a group of law 
professors, then the sentence might be true if Kevin were six feet tall. The sentence 
would be false, however, if the appropriate comparison class were NBA players.88 
Much of the Constitution’s semantic vagueness arises from its use of gradable 
adjectives. This is particularly true with respect to the document’s criminal procedures 
protections. The Sixth Amendment’s speedy trial right, for example, is expressed in 
terms of a gradable adjective (“speedy”) that exists in reference to a comparison 
83 See Christopher Kennedy, Vagueness and Grammar: The Semantics of Relative and 
Absolute Gradable Adjectives, 30 LINGUISTICS & PHIL. 1, 3–6 (2007) (defining and giving 
examples of gradable adjectives). 
84 See Jason Stanley, On the Linguistic Basis for Contextualism, 119 PHIL. STUD. 119, 
124 (2004). 
85 See Kennedy, supra note 83, at 7–8; Ewan Klein, A Semantics for Positive and 
Comparative Adjectives, 4 LINGUISTICS & PHIL. 1, 12–13 (1980). 
86 See Kennedy, supra note 83, at 3. This is the prevailing view among philosophers of 
language. But see generally HERMAN CAPPELEN & ERNIE LEPORE, INSENSITIVE SEMANTICS: 
A DEFENSE OF SEMANTIC MINIMALISM AND SPEECH ACT PLURALISM (2005) (arguing that 
gradable adjectives are not context sensitive). 
87 See Klein, supra note 85, at 12–16 (discussing comparison classes and giving examples); 
see also Kennedy, supra note 83, at 3, 7–11 (discussing the effect of comparison classes). 
88 See NBA League Averages, BASKETBALLREFERENCE, http://www.basketball-reference 
.com/leagues/NBA_stats.html [https://perma.cc/2M26-XEAR] (listing the average height of 
NBA players in the 2015–2016 season as 6’7”). 
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class (“trial”). Thus, in determining whether the right to a speedy trial is violated, one 
does not compare a trial’s length to that of all things in the world that have a beginning 
and ending. One does not ask whether the trial was speedy in comparison to Usain 
Bolt’s completion of a 100-meter race, or in comparison to the formation of a glacier. 
Rather, one compares a trial’s length to the lengths of some relevant class of trials. 
Similarly, the Eighth Amendment includes two gradable adjectives—“cruel” and 
“unusual”—that are expressed in reference to some set of criminal punishments.89 
More subtly, the Fourth Amendment’s search-and-seizure protections are expressed 
using the gradable adjective “unreasonable”—one searchcan be more or less reasonable 
than another—and two potential comparison classes (“searches” or “seizures”).90 
This type of semantic vagueness generates significant divergences in how law-
makers implement constitutional protections. Because gradable adjectives are context-
sensitive, lawmakers working in different contexts will have different understandings 
of constitutional language. Specifically, if lawmakers differ in their understanding 
of the relevant comparison class of an expression that involves a gradable adjective, 
they will diverge in their understandings of the expression’s truth conditions. There 
are two well-recognized ways in which this can occur. 
First, disagreement between speakers will exist when there is imprecision as to 
the comparison class a speaker has in mind for a specific utterance.91 Imagine that 
Kevin is a six-foot-tall former NBA player who went on to become a law professor. 
If a speaker says, “Kevin is tall,” the context may leave it unclear as to which 
comparison class the speaker has in mind. Unless this imprecision is resolved, then 
one cannot determine whether the sentence is true. Similarly, two sets of lawmakers 
may disagree as to the comparison class relevant to determining whether a particular 
trial delay violated the Sixth Amendment’s “right to a speedy . . . trial[.]”92 If the 
trial in question is for murder, should it be compared only to other murder trials, or 
would it be appropriate to consider burglary trials as well? If only murder trials are 
to be considered, should we differentiate between a complex murder-for-hire trial 
involving no witnesses and a relatively straightforward crime-of-passion trial that 
involves several witnesses? Each of these questions about the relevant comparison 
class will affect a lawmaker’s constitutional analysis. 
Second, and relatedly, the truth conditions of an utterance using a gradable ad-
jective can shift according to the object that is being described. Some theorists argue 
that even if the comparison class for an utterance is explicit, the truth conditions of a 
gradable adjective will shift depending on the interests of the speaker or contextual fac-
tors that relate to the object to which the speaker is referring.93 Regardless whether 
89 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
90 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
91 See Kennedy, supra note 83, at 9–10 (discussing the potential ambiguity that an im-
plicit comparison class creates). 
92 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
93 See Fara, supra note 57, at 54–63 (discussing the relationship between a speaker’s 
interests and the truth conditions in use for a vague expression); Kennedy, supra note 83, at 
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one accepts this position, the object of an utterance will provide valuable context as 
to the likely comparison class at issue.94 (If we know that Kevin is a first-rate law 
professor but had an undistinguished basketball career, then we’ll have a good sense 
of the comparison class that is intended when people mention him at a faculty 
lunch.) In either case, lawmakers will be influenced by the case that generates a 
constitutional decision involving a semantically vague expression.95 If a lawmaker 
is discussing the scope of the Speedy Trial Clause in the context of a high-profile 
detainee case, then the relevant standards of comparison might consist of trials 
involving complex terrorism-related charges.96 By contrast, if a judge is trying to 
decide whether the speedy trial right was violated in a run-of-the-mill burglary case, 
the relevant standards may involve a very different set of trials. 
Because courts and legislatures encounter very different kinds of policy prob-
lems, they will diverge significantly in their application of constitutional provisions 
that involve gradable adjectives. Both courts and legislatures operate under significant 
constraints that influence the issues that appear ontheir respective policy agendas.97 
With a few exceptions, the Supreme Court has control over its own docket and can 
select cases that conform to the Justices’ policy agendas.98 At the same time, how-
ever, the Court’s case selection is governed by many institutional norms that are 
unrelated to the facts of the particular case before it.99 By contrast, legislative agendas 
are often driven by “policy shocks,” including high-profile events that mobilize 
legislators to overcome the institutional hurdles that typically prevent new laws from 
being enacted.100 Accordingly, these institutions will differ with regard to the objects 
16–21 (arguing that the standards of comparison for an utterance usinga gradable adjective shift 
based on the object of the utterance rather than being relativized to the interests of the speaker). 
94 See Hans Kamp & Barbara Partee, Prototype Theory and Compositionality, 57 COGNI-
TION 129, 142–43 (1995) (explaining that a comparison class “is often, but not exclusively, 
provided by the noun of the adjective-noun construction”). 
95 This argument is closely related to the role of prototypes in the analysis of vague legal 
expressions. See, e.g., Lawrence M. Solan, Vagueness and Ambiguity in Legal Interpretation, 
in 23 LINGUISTIC INSIGHTS: VAGUENESS IN NORMATIVE TEXTS 73, 80 (Vijay K. Bhatia et al. 
eds., 2005); Waldron, supra note 8, at 520–21. 
96 See, e.g., United States v. Ghailani, 733 F.3d 29 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. 
Ct. 1523 (2014). 
97 See BRYAN D. JONES & FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER, THE POLITICS OF ATTENTION: HOW 
GOVERNMENT PRIORITIZES PROBLEMS 16 (2005) (discussing the time and informational 
constraints that shape Congress’s policy agenda); Anthony O’Rourke, The Political Economy 
of Criminal Procedure Litigation, 45 GA. L. REV. 721, 731 (2011) (discussing constraints 
on the Supreme Court’s policy agenda). 
98 O’Rourke, supra note 97, at 745–46. 
99 See, e.g., H.W. PERRY, JR., DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN THE UNITED 
STATES SUPREME COURT 246 (1991) (quoting a Supreme Court Justice’s observation that 
circuit splits are an indicator that the Court should grant certiorari). 
100 See JONES & BAUMGARTNER, supra note 97, at 55–56 (discussing the potential of new 
information to “shock” and spur legislative action and using the corporate scandals of 2001– 
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to which they are seeking to apply context-sensitive constitutional provisions. This, 
in turn, will lead them to embrace quite different understandings of the semantically 
vague expressions that they are working with. 
Thus, a careful account of semantic vaguenesssuggests that interpretive divergence 
and institutional conflicts are products of the Constitution’s design. The document 
establishes three separate branches of government, and gives those branches overlap-
ping authority to implement semantically vague provisions of its text. Accordingly, 
there are multiple institutions empowered to make competing decisions about how 
the Constitution’s text applies in borderline cases. As an epistemic matter, it is im-
possible to say that one of these decisions is true while the others are false. Thus, as 
Jack Balkin observed, the Constitution serves to regulate political life both through 
“constitutional language and through the institutions, practices, and traditions that 
are built around this language.”101 To this observation, one can add that the Constitu-
tion’s combination of vagueness (with respect to its rights provisions) and specificity 
(with respect to its structural provisions) serves to ensure continuing interinstitu-
tional competition over the document’s meaning. 
IV. PRECISIFICATION AND THE INTERPRETATION/CONSTRUCTION DEBATES 
This Article contends that lawmakers occupying different institutional roles will 
necessarily diverge in how they precisify semantically vague phrases.102 To the extent 
that this argument is correct, it can help to clarify much of the terminological and 
normative confusion that plagues the current literature on extrajudicial constitutional-
ism. Over the past two decades, there has been explosion of scholarship examining 
the ways in which constitutional law is made both within and outside the courts. 
This scholarship had led even sophisticated originalists to acknowledge that law-
makers implement the Constitution through a combination of judicial doctrines, 
executive actions, and legislative choices, none of which is strictly compelled by the 
Constitution’s semantic meaning.103 The sheer abundance of this literature, however, 
has generated a considerable amount of terminological and conceptual confusion 
about the nature of constitutional lawmaking. A philosophically informed account 
of semantic vagueness, I argue, can allow us to use a simplified terminology to 
address a range of constitutional problems.104 
101 See BALKIN, supra note 4, at 41. 
102 See supra Part III. 
103 See, e.g., BALKIN, supra note 4, at 15 (“Constitutional doctrines created by courts, and 
institutions and practices created by the political branches, flesh out and implement the con-
stitutional text and underlying principles.”); KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL 
INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 7 (1999) 
(“[C]onstitutional construction is essentially political.”). 
104 This is not to suggest that all debates over the meaning of constitutional interpretation 
are unproductive. Rather, the terminological confusion that these debates have generated can 
serve to becloud arguments over other, unrelated constitutional matters. 
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Specifically, the concept of “precisifying” semantically vague expressions can 
allow scholars to sidestep a number of unproductive debates over the meaning of 
constitutional “interpretation.” Legal theorists have appropriated the term “interpre-
tation” in ways that conflict with the ordinary meaning of the term and the technical 
definitions that other theorists have offered. Andrei Marmor, for example, has argued 
that “interpretation” occurs in the exceptional case in which a legal text does not have 
a clear and ordinary “understanding.”105 For Marmor, legal “interpretation” occurs 
when the linguistic determinants of meaning do not resolve the question, and the 
interpreter must exercise some degree of evaluative judgment.106 Marmor uses this 
definition of interpretation to attack originalist theories of constitutional and statutory 
interpretation, arguing that constitutional interpretation requires a degree of normative 
reasoning that is incompatible with originalism.107 
By contrast, constitutional originalists have offered narrow definitions of “inter-
pretation” that make a space for normative reasoning in constitutional law. Keith 
Whittington and Larry Solum, forexample, differentiate between the “interpretation” 
of relatively precise constitutional provisions and the “construction” of vague con-
stitutional provisions.108 According to these scholars, constitutional “interpretation” 
occurs when there is only one permissible understanding of a textual provision, 
albeit one that might involve pragmatic and contextual considerations.109 “Construc-
tion,” by contrast, involves the inherently political act of deciding on the single best 
understanding of an indeterminate constitutional provision.110 In other words, these 
originalists define “interpretation” like Marmor defines “understanding,” and define 
“construction” like Marmor defines “interpretation.”111 
Each of these accounts of “interpretation” provides a way of accurately describ-
ing the practice of constitutional law while insisting upon the determinacy of much 
of the Constitution’s text. But this clarity comes at the cost of adopting a definition 
105 See MARMOR, supra note 44, at 108. 
106 See id. (defining interpretation so that it “involves the exercise of some judgment, when 
it calls for some evaluative considerations about what would make more sense, what would 
fit better, or what would be a better understanding of the object of interpretation compared 
to other plausible interpretations of it”). 
107 See id. at 8 (summarizing his critique of textualism in statutory and constitutional 
interpretation). 
108 WHITTINGTON, supra note 103, at 5–13 (defining constitutional “interpretation” as the 
“process of discovering the meaning of the constitutional text” using ordinary methods of 
judicial reasoning and “construction” asthe “essentially political” process of implementing 
underdetermined constitutional provisions); see also WHITTINGTON, supra note 10, at 3–19 
(further elaborating the concept of constitutional construction); Solum, supra note 10, at 98 
(providing a standard definition of vagueness and stating “ambiguities in legal texts can (usually) 
be resolved by interpretation, but constitutional vagueness always requires construction”). 
109 See WHITTINGTON, supra note 103, at 5–6; Solum, supra note 10, at 98. 
110 See WHITTINGTON, supra note 103, at 6–10; Solum, supra note 10, at 98. 
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of “interpretation” that radically departs from the ordinary usage of that term.112 By 
contrast, Jack Balkin uses a capacious understanding of “interpretation” to develop 
an alternative account of originalism. Specifically, Balkin defines “constitutional 
interpretation” to include both the “ascertainment of meaning” through ordinary lin-
guistic practices and the “construction” of a text using “all of the various modalities 
of interpretation: arguments from history, structure, ethos, consequences, and prece-
dent.”113 For Balkin, the term “interpretation” encompasses all of the categories 
advanced by Marmor, Solum, and Whittington. Balkin’s definition is intended to 
reflect the ordinary meaning of constitutional “interpretation” at the cost of some 
degree of taxonomic precision. 
These debates have resulted in overlapping definitions of “interpretation” that 
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Interpretation Construction Interpretation 
This definitional proliferation results from a valuable debate over the normatively 
correct methods of constitutional interpretation. With respect to other research ques-
tions, however, the terminological morass is unnecessary and conceptually confusing. 
One can sidestep the morass by recognizing that all the hermeneutic activities 
described above are ways of implementing—and, in the case of semantically vague 
112 Cf. ENDICOTT, supra note 8, at 170 (“The grammar of interpretation cannot be expli-
cated by treating some paradigm cases as deviant or metaphorical. An account of the concept 
of interpretation should admit interpretations of dreams, novels, census data, seismograph 
records, constitutions, and the entrails of a chicken, without dismissing any asnon-standard 
uses of the word.”). 
113 BALKIN, supra note 4, at 4 (footnote omitted). 
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expressions, precisifying—constitutional texts.114 The semantic vagueness literature 
highlights the application of expressions to objects. (“Mount Everest is tall.” “The 
chair is red.”) If the expression is semantically vague, then there are cases in which one 
does not know whether to apply the expression.115 In such borderline cases, one can 
precisify the vague expression by stipulating whether or not it applies given the con-
text.116 Even when an expression is determinate, however, one can characterize a 
speaker as “implementing”an expression when she applies it to an object. For example, 
if one explained to a child that “a chair is a piece of furniture,” then one might be 
implementing the expression by applying it to an “object” in a non-borderline case. 
This precisification account easily maps onto the familiar idea of “implement-
ing” the Constitution’s text through judicial doctrine. According to Richard Fallon’s 
influential framework, constitutional law consists largely of doctrines designed to 
implement the Constitution’s text so judges can use the document to authoritatively 
resolve specific cases.117 Although he does not use the term, Fallon’s argument relies 
on the principle of juridical bivalence.118 The Constitution must “function effectively 
as law,” which requires the Supreme Court to “provide an authoritative resolution of 
disputes” that are grounded in semantically vague (or otherwise indeterminate) tex-
tual provisions.119 The Court, for example, has constructed doctrinal rules to clarify 
whether a race-preferential school admissions policy violates the Equal Protection 
Clause.120 And, returning to the speedy trial example, the Court has established a 
114 Superficially, this argument resonates with Daryl Levinson’s pragmatist position that 
there is no distinction between the tasks of discerning the Constitution’s normative content 
and the construction of constitutional decision rules and remedies. See generally Daryl J. 
Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 857 (1999). 
Cf. Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1, 9 (2004) 
(presenting an influential taxonomy that distinguishes between “constitutional operative 
propositions” and the “decision rules” that give effect to those propositions (internal quo-
tation marks omitted)). In fact, I am arguing that it is simply unnecessary to make the distinction 
in order to address some important theoretical questions. In other contexts, I have found it 
theoretically productive to maintain a conceptual distinction between the Constitution’s 
normative content and the doctrines that are designed to implement that content—even when 
doing so helps to contribute to the terminological confusion that plagues constitutional theory. 
See Anthony O’Rourke, Statutory Constraints and Constitutional Decisionmaking, 2015 
WIS.L.REV.87, 108 & nn.86–91 (explaining how a constitutional decision can be regulatory 
“to incentivize nonjudicial officers to engage in specific behaviors that are not clearly set 
forth by statute, regulation, or constitutional text”); Anthony O’Rourke, Structural Overdele-
gation in Criminal Procedure, 103 J. CRIM.L.&CRIMINOLOGY 407, 419–20 (2013) (describing 
the Supreme Court’s use of delegation). 
115 See ENDICOTT, supra note 8, at 31; see also supra notes 42–44 and accompanying text. 
116 See supra notes 55–82 and accompanying text. 
117 See generally Fallon, Jr., supra note 35. 
118 See supra notes 61–62 and accompanying text. 
119 See Fallon, Jr., supra note 35, at 56. 
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multifactor balancing test that lower courts must apply to determine whether, in spe-
cific cases, the government has violated the Sixth Amendment.121 
Legislative constitutionalism can likewise be characterized as a form of constitu-
tional precisification. To whatever degree one acknowledges that the Constitution 
authorizes Congress to implement vague constitutional principles, one must concede 
that legislative interpretations will diverge from traditional court-centered under-
standings of the Constitution’s text. From a linguistic perspective, however, both 
institutions are engaged in the same task: instructing how to resolve borderline cases 
in which one cannot know, and must therefore merely stipulate, whether or not a 
vague text applies. Accordingly, legislative constitutionalism can be parsimoniously 
described as an account of how Congress contributes to the development of constitu-
tional meaning through precisifying of vague texts. 
Thus, constitutional “interpretation” and “construction” (in the many ways those 
terms have been defined) are simply different approaches to precisifying the Consti-
tution’s text. All participants in the “interpretation” debate acknowledge that some 
constitutional provisions are determinate, and thus only have viable semantic mean-
ing in a particular context. In these cases, lawmakers can implement the Constitution 
by applying the semantically viable meaning to the case before them. Such cases, 
however, rarely give rise to serious constitutional disputes.122 Other constitutional 
provisions are semantically vague or otherwise indeterminate, and require lawmakers 
to “precisify” their content by applying them in borderline cases. In some subsets 
of these cases, the contextual factors that make a particular precisification plausible 
might include the Constitution’s structure, historical practices, and other traditional 
modalities of interpretation.123 In other cases, the lawmaker will have to engage in 
normative or straightforwardly political reasoning in order to arrive at a plausible 
precisification of the Constitution’s text. In all cases, however, we can speak of the 
lawmakers—including judges, legislators, and agency policymakers—as working 
to “precisify” the Constitution’s meaning. 
This terminological simplification serves to provide a concise explanation of 
why lawmakers diverge in how they implement the Constitution. Specifically, when 
two institutions are authorized to interpret a legal text, semantic vagueness will 
necessarily give rise toa multiplicity of correct interpretations which take the form 
of divergent applications of the text to borderline cases. This, in turn, allows two 
121 See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972). Thus, the Court created amalleable 
standard that enables judges to make an equitable assessment of whether to accord the 
speedy trial right in a particular case. For further discussion, see Anthony O’Rourke, The 
Speedy Trial Right and National Security Detention, 12 J. INT’L CRIM. JUSTICE 871 (2014). 
122 There have been no serious constitutional arguments, for example, challenging the 
Constitution’s clear requirement that “[t]he Senate of the United States shall be composed 
of two Senators from each State[.]” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1. 
123 See BOBBITT, supra note 33, at 9–24 (discussing traditional and historical modalities 
of constitutional interpretation). 
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institutions to promulgate conflicting, but equally accurate, decisions that are con-
strained by the same constitutional text. 
CONCLUSION 
The Constitution contains a number of vague provisions, and also creates a 
diverse set of lawmaking institutions with overlapping authority to implement those 
provisions. Given this combination of structural precision and normative vagueness, 
it should come as little surprise when courts and legislatures diverge in their under-
standings of the Constitution’s rights provisions. By offering a new framework for 
analyzing this phenomenon, this Article illustrates that philosophy of language offers 
valuable insights to scholars who are struggling to understand how different branches 
of government—operating with competing agendas, different institutional structures, 
and limited information—make constitutional law. According to most analysts of 
extrajudicial constitutionalism, when implementing vague constitutional provisions 
the political branches are engaging in a fundamentally political activity unrelated 
to the practice of interpreting the Constitution’s text.124 This Article demonstrates, 
however, that vague constitutional language can influence these political activities 
in subtle and surprising ways. It thus exposes an overlooked connection between 
extrajudicial constitutionalism and the Constitution’s semantic architecture. 
124 See supra notes 108–10 and accompanying text. 
